

discourse that effaces a “Portuguese glorious past,” textually replacing it with a Mozambican past and present (225).

Overall, *The Golden Cage* is important for its textual readings, and the excerpts from interviews with authors that it includes. However, it would have benefited from a more rigorous editing process, prior to publication.

Phillip Rothwell
Rutgers University

Johnson III, Ollie Andrew. *Brazilian Party Politics and the Coup of 1964*. Gainesville: UP of Florida, 2001. 176 pp.

In his book, *Brazilian Party Politics and the Coup of 1964*, Ollie Andrew Johnson III revisits the crucial question of the role of political parties in the breakdown of democracy in Brazil in 1964. He contests the received wisdom that it was Brazilian parties’ indiscipline, ideological incoherence, and inability to compromise that contributed to the failure of democracy. In Johnson’s view, it was the growing electoral strength of leftist parties and progressive factions, and the strengthening of the party system as a whole, that led the traditional right and center to abandon democratic institutions and support a military coup. The argument rests on an analysis of three dimensions of party behavior: interparty, intraparty and transparty competition. Each chapter provides an interesting new perspective and new data on these aspects of party behavior during this period. Johnson’s most important contributions are to our understanding of the evolution of the electoral strength of the left and the behavior of cross-party factions in the legislature. At the same time, his claim that the clear trend in the party system was toward a programmatic reform emanating from the left is not convincingly supported by this data. And the links between changes in the party system and the decision of the center and right to support a coup are virtually absent from the analysis. The result is a study that provides an interesting new perspective on how the Brazilian party system evolved over this period. It is less convincing in countering the dominant view that the left shared many of the institutional weaknesses of the right and the center and that it was a general weakness of democratic institutions that contributed fatally to breakdown.

Johnson’s first analysis focuses on the evolution of the electoral strength of the three major parties of the right (União Democrática Nacional or UDN), center (Partido Social Democrático or PSD) and left (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, or PTB) over the period. He challenges the view that there was no clear direction of change in the party system primarily by dispelling the view that the rise of the PTB was strictly regional, located primarily in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. In addition to emphasizing the decline of the PSD, Johnson sheds new light on the growing national strength of the left. He shows that while the PTB delegation in the Lower House increased by 75% over the period, Rio Grande do Sul contributed only 12% of this total. While these figures do much to dispel the view that the PTB was strong primarily only in one state, he does not provide a state-by-state breakdown of the PTB delegation. Figures demonstrating that the remaining 86% of deputies were spread across a number of states would have strengthened his argument for a national realignment of party forces. Nevertheless, Johnson’s point that the PTB was more of a national phenomenon than previously recognized is an important contribution.

Demonstrating increased electoral strength of a political party is a much more straightforward task than establishing the programmatic commitments of the same. Johnson's analysis of intra-party factionalism and the purported rise of programmatic factions within each of the major parties lacks grounding in any literature dedicated to this complicated question. The author reviews the literature on the rise of a group of new leaders which challenge the old guard in each of the three major parties. His discussion covers the successful elimination of the young turks in the PSD and the UDN, as well as the unresolved conflict in the PTB. Unfortunately, he provides no new evidence to support the bold claim that each of these new factions was committed to eliminating clientelist practices and implementing programmatic reforms. Johnson accepts the new factions' stated commitments to programmatic reform at face value. Yet a long literature on clientelism cautions that the onset of urban mass politics does not necessarily imply the death of clientelism, and that claims of programmatic commitments cannot be accepted at face value, especially by those out of power. Knowledge of the subsequent careers of three of the most prominent leaders of these new factions lends support to the view that programmatic declarations must be evaluated with caution. The fact that Leonel Brizola, José Sarney and Antônio Carlos Magalhães have survived to the present day based on strategies that few would characterize as programmatic does not tend to support the view that they were representatives of a new, principled ideological politics. Indeed, their subsequent success suggests that the real threat posed by the young turks was that they would simply *replace* the existing clientelist bosses, not supplant their political style with programmatic reform. Moreover, the author fails to present any evidence of the left's supposed greater programmatic inclinations. His own discussion of the major policy program advocated and implemented by the PTB, social security, coincides with the conclusion of the pre-eminent analyst of the program that "The social security system was the epitome of clientilistic politics which permeated the entire political system..." (Malloy, 1979:119). In sum, while it is indisputable that leftist parties and interest groups were gaining ground throughout the period, it is less clear that these groups were the harbingers of the kinds of changes in the party system that would bring about a transformation from clientelist to programmatic politics.

The final major analysis examines cross-party alliances in legislative voting. Here Johnson argues that the emphasis on the weakness of Brazilian parties misses the mark in terms of understanding the evolution of the representative system. In his view, the parties were challenged as the system's central representative political institutions by the two inter-party fronts that emerged late in the period. Johnson makes a key contribution by insisting that analysts must take these cross-party alliances seriously if we are to understand representative institutions. The fact that these fronts were composed of inter-party factions rather than party coalitions, however, raises important questions about democratic representation that the author himself does not resolve. Johnson's major claim is that the two inter-party fronts displayed more programmatic behavior than the parties themselves, but once again, he provides minimal new evidence to corroborate this view. In terms of internal discipline, programmatic behavior is somewhat difficult to judge, because Johnson does not provide Rice Indices or some other relevant measure of internal cohesion for comparison. With regard to inter-party divisiveness—the degree to which representative institutions offer voters clear alternatives—his data is inconclusive at best. In the penultimate government of the period (Kubitschek), the three major parties (encompassing 81% of the legislative seats) voted the same way on 46.4 percent of the bills. Under Goulart the two fronts voted the same way on ten of the seventeen (58.8%) roll calls taken. Thus, the degree to which alternative parties or alliances offered voters clear alternatives based on legislative voting actually decreased slightly under Goulart. It could be argued that the emergence of two broad fronts provided greater clarity between

policy alternatives for voters. But this begs the question, what is the link between voters, the electoral agents (for Johnson, the growing PTB *party*), and the inter-party groupings that were the key actors in the legislature? If the left provided the major impetus for programmatic reform, it remains puzzling that the major leftist party was not the protagonist of this movement (as certainly the PT, or Worker's Party, has been since the return to democracy in 1985). Rather than hammer out a program based on internal compromise and attempt to build a party-based coalition, the PTB split along with all the other major parties. In this sense the PTB's ability to compromise and build coalitions—the brick and mortar of democratic politics—was no better than the right or the center. This fact casts further doubt on view that the left was the programmatic reformist actor Johnson paints it to be.

In sum, although the study provides interesting new insight into party behavior and representative institutions in Brazil, ultimately the analysis does not add up to a strong case that it was the strengthening of the party system and the threat of the left's programmatic reform that led to the coup of 1964. While Johnson provides interesting new analysis of electoral trends and legislative behavior, neither the chapter on intra-party factions nor on cross-party behavior succeeds in dispelling the view that the left was equally as unprepared as the right or the center to implement needed reforms. Given this, it is difficult to reject the view that the overall institutional weakness of the party system was critical to democratic breakdown.

Mona M. Lyne
University of South Carolina