

The Last Political Prisoner

*Juvêncio Mazzarollo and the Twilight of
Brazil's Dictatorship*¹

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De 1982 a 1984, o jornalista Juvêncio Mazzarollo foi preso sob a Lei de Segurança Nacional. Durante um período no qual o Brasil supostamente era num processo de democratização, a repressão injusta do Mazzarollo se virou símbolo das contradições da abertura. Conhecido como “o último preso político,” Mazzarollo exemplifica as complexidades da transição da ditadura e aprofunda o nosso entendimento de como as forças populares—tal nacionais como locais—negociaram e contestaram a abertura.

April 6, 1981 began as a normal day at the Foz de Iguaçu office of the Brazilian newspaper *Nosso Tempo*. The paper's three editors were busy putting the final touches on that week's issue when a knock came from the front door. Standing outside was an unknown man dressed in a dark suit and tie. The stranger introduced himself as a member of the Federal Police and presented a letter for Juvêncio Mazzarollo, one of *Nosso Tempo*'s editors and lead writers. Mazzarollo had been summoned to meet with a powerful local politician named Elias Kudsi and spent the rest of the day nervously awaiting further instructions. At 4:00 p.m. a telephone call announced that Kudsi was finally ready, and Juvêncio was quickly escorted to the Federal Police station.²

The son of Italian immigrant farmers, Juvêncio grew up in the state of Rio Grande do Sul and from an early age was exposed to injustices in the Brazilian countryside, both by toiling alongside his family as an agricultural laborer and later through the Liberation Theology teachings of the local church. His first personal encounter with the military regime came in 1968

when he was thrown in jail and held overnight for having participated in the student leaders conference in Ibiúna, São Paulo (*Encontro da União Nacional dos Estudantes*, UNE). For most of the 1970s Juvêncio worked as a public school teacher in Medianeira, Paraná, but was fired in 1978 over remarks that he made during a strike. Paraná's governor at the time, Jaime Canet, had called the striking teachers "subversive," to which Juvêncio declared that, "the only subversive here is the Governor since he ignored the law." Unemployed and blacklisted from public sector jobs, Juvêncio struggled for nearly two years until moving to Foz do Iguaçu where he joined with two colleagues to start an independent political newspaper.³

On this day in 1981, the journalist with a background of regional activism now found himself in a building of the national armed forces, representatives of a Brazilian state ruled by a military dictatorship. Upon arriving at the Federal Police offices, Juvêncio was placed in an interrogation room and verbally harassed by the city's mayor, a local judge, and an influential army colonel named João Guilherme da Costa Labre—the commanding officer of the 34th Motorized Infantry Battalion. From this moment forward, Juvêncio became the central figure in a conflict that pitted his newspaper against the Brazilian military regime. Although no official charges were brought against him that evening, authorities soon accused Juvêncio of having violated the National Security Act (LSN, *Lei da Segurança Nacional*) and threw him in jail the following summer. For nearly two years Juvêncio remained in prison and was given his freedom only when an international solidarity campaign—coupled with the staging of two hunger strikes—forced the government to grant his release. During this period at the end of Brazil's dictatorship, not a single other journalist was jailed. After twenty years of military rule, Juvêncio Mazarollo was "the last political prisoner."

Scholars have entirely overlooked Juvêncio's imprisonment, yet it is a history that offers significant contributions to an understanding of Brazil's dictatorship and the process of *abertura* (democratization). Juvêncio may have been the last, but he certainly was not the only political prisoner during the two decades of military rule; under Brazil's dictatorship thousands were jailed, killed, tortured, disappeared, and repressed, including many journalists. Nor was he the most famous political prisoner in the early 1980s. The union leader and future president, Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva was jailed in 1980 under the LSN, as was the Amazonian land and human rights activist Chico Mendes. Juvêncio's story, however, stands out for its position at the intersection of three distinct yet highly entangled forces: opposition movements against the dictatorship, the development goals of the Brazilian state, and the bureaucratic and popular components of the *abertura*. It is thus essential to examine why, during a period when Brazil was supposedly well on its way to a democratic opening, Mazarollo was imprisoned from 1982 to 1984.

As will be argued throughout this paper, Juvêncio was thrown in jail for two reasons that illuminate both the local and national dynamics of Brazil's fragmented process of democratization. First, his denunciations of torture and corruption by local authorities drew the ire of the military elite in Foz do Iguaçu—especially the city's mayor, Coronel Clóvis Cunha Vianna, and the aforementioned Colonel João Labre. Motivated by the ongoing *abertura*, Mazzarollo saw his scathing exposés as belonging to a broader movement of media freedom and popular dissent. The local elite, however, were not yet ready to allow these new spaces of criticism. As a result, they initiated a criminal trial to guard the privileges to which they had become accustomed over the previous two decades. If Juvêncio's repression was initially a result of the clash between how Brazil's *abertura* was understood by local actors, it escalated after a second series of events gave the conflict a national audience.

In the early 1980s, Foz do Iguaçu was the epicenter of the military's development program since it was home to the Itaipu hydroelectric dam, the "project of the century" that was considered the key to placing Brazil amongst the world's most advanced countries.⁴ During a global era of mega projects and pharaonic development initiatives, Itaipu was unparalleled: it cost \$20 billion, took two decades to build, contains enough iron and steel to build nearly four hundred Eiffel Towers, and would eventually supply over 20% of all electricity in Brazil. Even more important than the magnitude of its size was its importance to the geopolitical vision of the Brazilian government. In order for Itaipu to become a reality Brazil had to first undertake a tense and protracted series of negotiations with Paraguay and Argentina over which countries, if any, had the right to produce energy in the region. This standoff became a symbol of national pride and in many ways the fight to harness the power of the Paraná River had become a fight for political and economic prominence in the Southern Cone. According to Nilson Monteiro, Itaipu was the primary driver in Brazil's success in supplanting Argentina as the major power in the region.⁵ For Brazil's military regime, Itaipu was far more than just a source of energy; it was the crown jewel of its development program, a beacon of nationalism, and an indicator of the country's emerging presence on the international stage.

However, construction of the dam and its adjacent reservoir basin came at the expense of the region's inhabitants and displaced over 42,000 people, a process of dislocation that catalyzed a movement of rural farmers that rallied against Itaipu under the banner of "justiça e terra."⁶ The movement had been building since the late 1970s and its high point came in March of 1981 when nearly 1,000 farmers marched on Foz de Iguaçu and set up a 54-day land encampment in front of the headquarters of the Itaipu Binational Corporation. Juvêncio Mazzarollo and his newspaper supported the encampment and

roundly criticized both Mayor Cunha Vianna and the national government for their treatment of the protesting farmers.

Juvêncio's earlier denouncements could be contained as a local affair but the national attention brought by the farmers' movement and the centrality of Itaipu to the dictatorship pushed Foz do Iguacu's military elite to silence *Nosso Tempo*. It was at this moment in April of 1981—at the height of the farmers' encampment against Itaipu—that Juvêncio was approached by the police. Over the next two years, Mazzarollo's trial and subsequent imprisonment embodied the tensions and competing experiences of Brazil's *abertura*. For the local elite who felt removed from the democratization process, Juvêncio's repression was an attempt to exercise their quickly fading power. For the national government, the coverage given to the farmers drew attention away from the triumphant narrative of Itaipu that they hoped to leave as a legacy before the full return of democratic rule. For opposition groups throughout Brazil, Juvêncio transcended his role as a dissident journalist to become a rallying point for democratization. This saga is a revealing example of how political and social networks, mass media, and international solidarity were used to bring specific campaigns to the forefront of public debates. This invokes Steve Stern's conceptualization of "politicocultural legitimacy," where both civil and political society seek to validate and consolidate their specific program.⁷ Juvêncio's trial and imprisonment captivated national headlines and debates, and its history is uniquely positioned to elucidate these understudied dynamics of the *abertura*. By investigating these complex perspectives, this paper will reveal the deeper meanings of Brazil's "last political prisoner."

Although there exists a large historiography on opposition to Brazil's dictatorship, it has tended to concentrate on armed struggle, political parties, organized unions, and the Church.⁸ As historians and activists have begun to reinterpret the period of dictatorship from new perspectives, a more recent wave of scholarship has focused on the history of journalists and the media. These studies—from mostly Brazilian authors—have chronicled the struggles of newspapers during military rule and made significant contributions to our understanding of opposition coalitions and civic-military relations. Much of this work looks either at media resistance or issues of censorship.⁹ The existing literature overwhelmingly agrees that the height of media repression occurred between 1968—with the passage of the authoritarian Institutional Act 5—and 1975, when Vladimir Herzog, a São Paulo journalist was imprisoned, tortured, and killed. At the most immediate level, then, Juvêncio's imprisonment nearly a decade later forces current scholarship to expand its periodization of media repression. Additionally, *Nosso Tempo's* founding in 1980 suggests that while the role of oppositional media at the national level diminished by the late 1970s—what one historian calls the

“institucionalização do jornalismo crítico”—in regions like Foz de Iguaçu there was both a space and a demand for dissident newspapers.¹⁰ Scholars interested in media and resistance must explore why Juvêncio was imprisoned so late during military rule.

The second and farther-reaching intervention of this essay is to use the case of Juvêncio to strengthen the historiography on Brazil’s transition out of dictatorship. Most scholarship on the *abertura* focuses on developments like the 1979 reforms that included the Amnesty Law and the Party Reform Law, the 1982 elections, and the 1983–1984 Diretas Já campaign. Although it has received far less attention, Juvêncio’s standoff with the Foz do Iguaçu elite and his support of the farmers’ movement exemplify how the struggle for democracy was experienced at the local level and in an area far from Brazil’s major cities. The aim here is not to overemphasize Juvêncio’s role in the return to democratic rule, but rather to illustrate how the *abertura* developed regionally throughout Brazil, an often contested and contradictory process that is emblematic of what James Green refers to as “the slow-motion return to democracy.”¹¹ Bernardo Kucinski states that the *abertura* was a controlled process that reaffirmed Brazil’s tradition of political conciliation amongst the elite.¹² Cases such as Juvêncio’s, however, complicate this interpretation by redirecting our attention to how non-elite actors negotiated the *abertura* throughout the country. Although Brazilian elites might have ultimately been the ones passing laws to bring about democracy, their policies were often the result of battles waged from below, like those of *Nosso Tempo*’s writers and the popular struggles they supported.

The most illuminating research for this article came from the archive of the Itaipu Binational Dam, a center that because of its centrality to the Brazilian dictatorship maintained extensive documentation from the military’s various surveillance organizations.¹³ These include files from the National Information Service (*Serviço Nacional de Informações*, SNI), the Federal Police, and Itaipu’s own internal security and legal apparatuses. Along with the research conducted at Itaipu and other archives in Paraná and Rio de Janeiro, the materials found herein were made possible by the generosity of individuals who made available their personal files. In particular, Juvêncio’s own collection of documents was graciously opened by his widow, Vilma Macedo, and his daughter, Rebecca Mazzarollo. Additionally, Aluizio Palmar—the former co-editor of *Nosso Tempo*—shared research that he had done in his work for the Center for Human Rights and Popular Memory.¹⁴

Finally, this article makes exhaustive use of the content and context of *Nosso Tempo*, a newspaper that has yet to be studied by a single scholar outside of Brazil.¹⁵ This methodology is contingent on the newspaper’s existence so late in the dictatorship. As a political prisoner held after the *abertura* was well under way, Juvêncio was allowed to continue writing from his jail cell


and maintained a weekly column in *Nosso Tempo*—a privilege not given to journalists imprisoned earlier in the military regime. This affords the opportunity to analyze his writings before, during, and after his internment. Juvêncio's prison writings therefore function as both the historical record of a political prisoner, and as commentary from Brazil's oppositional media. To balance and expand on the perspectives provided by *Nosso Tempo*, various newspapers from throughout Brazil were consulted.

Starting in May of 1983, *Nosso Tempo* routinely referred to Juvêncio as “the last political prisoner,” a designation that was picked up by the mainstream press the following December when the National Security Act officially ended.¹⁶ When the LSN was revoked, most of Brazil's political prisoners were finally given their freedom. This process freed other journalists who were in jail at the same time as Juvêncio, including four writers at the oppositional weekly *Coorjornal* and a journalist named Ricardo Lessa at *Hora do Povo*, the print organ of the MR-8 revolutionary group.¹⁷ It should be noted that in December of 2014 Brazil released the findings of its National Truth Commission (CNV), a detailed exposé on the crimes of the military regime. Although the CNV includes lists of the known victims of torture, murder, and forced disappearance, there is no inventory of political prisoners; as such it is impossible to definitively state that Juvêncio Mazarollo was “the last political prisoner.” Despite the likelihood that Juvêncio was, in fact, the final journalist imprisoned during Brazil's dictatorship, it is more instructive to focus on the symbolic and politicizing dimensions of his assumed title.

Juvêncio's designation as “the last political prisoner” indicates just how significant his story was for a nation in transition. Here, it matters less that Juvêncio in particular was known as the final prisoner after two decades of repression. The meaning lies in its wording and context: calling Juvêncio the *last* prisoner nearly two years before the military actually ceded power implies a collective awareness that an opening was imminent. As the last political prisoner in a nation still ruled by dictatorship, Juvêncio Mazarollo reflected both the call for opposition and the promise of a new political order.

Nosso Tempo Enters the Fray

Nosso Tempo published its inaugural issue on December 3, 1980 and was established as an avenue for denouncing the injustices of the military regime. In its first publication, the opening editorial introduced its readers to the paper's ideological pillars: “Nós, do *Nosso Tempo*, procuraremos fazer a nossa opção. Nós optamos pela liberdade. Consequentemente, buscamos a independência. Resistiremos até o limite [. . .] Ninguém poderá negociar conosco nossa opção. Nossos princípios não tem preço. Jamais faremos deste órgão de comunicação um carrasco de nossos princípios.”¹⁸ *Nosso Tempo*'s objective



The cover of *Nosso Tempo*'s first issue, published on December 3, 1980

was made explicit on the cover of its very first issue. Looming above the bold-faced title “FÁBRICA DE CONFISSÕES” was a drawing of a naked man, hands tied together, hanging upside down from his ankles while snarling men in overcoats held him in place and burnt his face with a lit cigarette. A reference to ongoing repression, the drawing depicted the torture method

called “the parrot’s perch” (*pau de arara*), a technique widely used by Brazil’s military. For the case of Juvêncio, it is critical to highlight the fact that in its denouncement of torture by Foz do Iguaçu’s military police, the only individual referenced was that of the city’s head military judge, João Kopytowsky.¹⁹ Judge Kopytowsky was surely enraged at being publicly accused of overseeing torture and, sure enough, he was one of the three men present at Juvêncio’s initial summons.

Although torture was a central theme in *Nosso Tempo*’s initial publication, critiques of the local government and the unfolding struggle of displaced farmers quickly became the newspaper’s primary focus. In only its third issue, *Nosso Tempo* printed a three-page story about the failures of the administration of Colonel Cunha Vianna. Writing that his newspaper did not want to “somente ser um órgão noticioso, mas também participar ativamente na vida do município,” Juvêncio Mazzarollo organized a roundtable discussion where he convened local left-wing figures and interviewed them about Cunha Vianna. The overwhelming impression given by Juvêncio’s report was of an incompetent mayor who had no support from the general population.²⁰ Within days Cunha Vianna himself contacted *Nosso Tempo* and demanded to be interviewed by Juvêncio.²¹ Juvêncio took advantage of this opportunity and confronted the Mayor about the mismanagement of public funds, his prioritization of Itaipu at the expense of Foz do Iguaçu residents, and the fact that he was appointed to office and never directly elected by popular vote. Perhaps sensing that the interview was portraying him as an out-of-touch military politician, Cunha Vianna advocated that his function was to humbly provide housing, education, and access to water and energy for those in need.²²

Whether or not the mayor succeeded in improving his image, a series of articles one month later revealed a troubling case of government corruption. *Nosso Tempo* obtained and printed a letter signed by the mayor that authorized the illegal seizure of the property and finances of a Foz do Iguaçu mechanic named Valdir Catafesta.²³ Two weeks after it published allegations of corruption, *Nosso Tempo* continued its critique of Cunha Vianna by detailing how he had recently submitted a request to have his official title changed from “Colonel” to “Mayor,” a development that *Nosso Tempo* mocked under the headline of “Perfeito tem vergonha de ser coronel?”²⁴ Juvêncio Mazzarollo and his newspaper had denounced Cunha Vianna’s administration for torture, corruption, and a disregard for the average citizens of Foz do Iguaçu, and until this point had done so with no repercussions. That changed in March of 1981 when *Nosso Tempo* began covering the farmers’ encampment in front of Itaipu.

The Itaipu hydroelectric project displaced 42,444 Brazilians (11.42% of the region’s total population) and a campaign had emerged in the late 1970s to organize the farmers. By the time *Nosso Tempo* published its initial issues at

the end of 1980, the struggle against Itaipu already had clear demands and a growing support base. The movement's earliest direct action came only a handful of months before *Nosso Tempo's* first printing. In July of 1980 the farmers staged a successful 16-day land occupation in the town of Santa Helena that, along with introducing their struggle to a national audience, received massive support from labor unions, political organizations, and social groups throughout Brazil. In the end, the Santa Helena encampment won a series of concessions from Itaipu, highlighted by a 75% increase in price compensation for soon-to-be-flooded lands.²⁵

By early spring of 1981—with only two years left before the planned flooding of the area—Itaipu had paid only 60% of the promised indemnifications. Motivated by an increased militancy within the farmers' struggle, now officially known as the Justice and Land Movement, and a desire to tighten the pressure on Itaipu, the farmers staged a second land encampment beginning on March 17 directly in front of Itaipu's construction site in Foz do Iguaçu. From the early moments of the encampment, it became obvious that it would last much longer than the Santa Helena action, as evidenced in the words of one participant: "Jamais Itaipu imaginava passar este vexame. O Brasil e o mundo passarão a contestá-la muito mais do que o foi até hoje."²⁶

It was under this climate that Judge Kopytowsky, Mayor Cunha Vianna, and Colonel Labre summoned Juvêncio Mazzarollo to Foz do Iguaçu's Federal Police building. According to Juvêncio's own report, the meeting quickly proceeded into a series of insults aimed at Juvêncio and the work of *Nosso Tempo*. Recounting the events of that initial meeting, Juvêncio identified the importance of the land encampment: "Naquela semana os agricultores desapropriados por Itaipu haviam acampo em Foz do Iguaçu e a situação na cidade era bastante tensa. Eles pediram ajuda, e o coronel Labre recusou. O jornal dava total cobertura ao movimento dos agricultores."²⁷ The generals criticized Juvêncio's editorial line and threatened him with legal punishment if the newspaper continued its coverage.²⁸ *Nosso Tempo* maintained its support of the farmers and condemned the local government's actions, most notably for having brought in state police against the encampment and for having cut off its water supply.²⁹

Although no official accusations were initially filed against Juvêncio, three days later on April 9, he and his co-editors, Aluizio Palmar and João Adelino de Souza, were charged with having violated Article 14 of the National Security Act. According to Article 14, it was a crime to "divulgar notícia falsa ou tendenciosa, ou fato verdadeiro truncado ou deturpado, de modo a indispor ou tentar indispor o povo contra as autoridades constituídas."³⁰ With so much at stake, it is not difficult to understand why Juvêncio was seen as a threat by authorities like Mayor Cunha Vianna, Colonel Labre and Judge Kopytowsky.

The investigation had been opened by the 5th Regional Military Tribunal and required all three editors to be brought to the Foz de Iguaçu police station to provide statements. With official charges lodged against them, the editors of *Nosso Tempo* used the pages of their newspaper to denounce the Brazilian state and vowed to defend their freedom of expression in the face of the National Security Act. The editorial published after the investigation began observed that, “Depois das revelações que vamos fazer aqui, quem ainda pensar que o inquérito aberto contra este jornal com vistas a enquadrá-lo na Lei de Segurança Nacional é justo, é porque está louco ou comendo conscientemente pedras por manteiga.”³¹ In reaction to his arrest, Aluizio Palmar stated simply, “Que abertura é esta?”³²

One of the main issues that troubled Juvêncio during this period was why the authorities targeted *Nosso Tempo*. If the government thought his newspaper was an avenue for subversive politics, he wanted to know, “Por que não perseguem e tentam destruir outros militantes da imprensa que não são jornalistas e estão completamente à vontade para puxar o saco de autoridades e poderosos?”³³ In its early existence *Nosso Tempo* was one of many oppositional newspapers and did not appear to have much influence outside of southwestern Brazil. The historian Thomas Skidmore has argued that heavy press censorship and repression following the 1968 passage of AI-5 stimulated the emergence of the new genre of publications in the 1970s from which *Nosso Tempo* would eventually emerge: the political weekly.³⁴ These political weeklies formed the base of the alternative press that from 1964 to 1980 included over 150 oppositional newspapers.³⁵ Bernardo Kucinski divides the alternative press into three sectors: the “satiricals” like *Pasquim*, *Bondinho*, *Ex*, and *Versus*; the “journalists” such as *Coorjornal* and *Repórter*, and the “revolutionaries” that were connected to political parties or fronts like *Opinão*, *Movimento*, and *Em Tempo*.³⁶ Kucinski highlights the political acuteness of the alternative press by contrasting it to the mainstream newspapers’ complacency toward the dictatorship, saying that the oppositional media made steadfast denunciations of torture and human rights violations, along with criticizing the government’s economic policies.³⁷

Despite the escalating conflict between Juvêncio Mazzarollo’s newspaper and the Brazilian state, *Nosso Tempo* and its editors won a major victory only three months after charges were first brought against them.³⁸ On July 22, 1981, Darcy Rissetti, a judge from the 5th regional military tribunal in Curitiba, rejected the original charges made against the three editors. Considering that a guilty verdict under Article 14 of the LSN carried a sentence of up to two years in prison, this appeared to be a turning point for the writers of *Nosso Tempo*. This sense of triumph, however, was squashed less than two months later when a new set of charges were filed, this time naming Juvêncio as the only accused. It was this accusation that landed Juvêncio in jail the following summer.

Singling out Juvêncio because of his “periculosidade,” this second round of charges was again filed under the National Security Act, but in addition to invoking the same Article 14 from the first arraignment, Juvêncio was now being accused of also having violated Articles 33, 36, and 42. Additionally, charges were brought against *Nosso Tempo* under Article 49 of the LSN.³⁹ The charges against Juvêncio carried a combined possibility of a twenty-year prison sentence. Whereas the earlier charges made against the three editors were based on general events and perceptions—an ambiguity that helped lead to the charges’ rejection in July—the indictment against Juvêncio was based specifically on an article he published in the July 29, 1981 issue of *Nosso Tempo* titled “You Can’t Milk a Dead Cow.” (*Não Se Tira Leite de Vaca Morta*) Although the article in question did include strong denunciations of the military regime, it was no more incendiary or radical than any of his previous writings.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the “Dead Cow” article was enough evidence for the military investigation to accuse Juvêncio and *Nosso Tempo* of having made “violent and direct acts against the regime of the constitutional authorities, seeking to incite true subversion.”⁴¹

What can be inferred from the military’s second round of charges against Juvêncio Mazzarollo? Was his July 29 article so provocative that it merited a criminal investigation? An overview of other newspapers during this period reveals that Brazilian journalists repeatedly challenged the military regime and suffered little to no repression. One example from 1978 shows just how much media freedoms had advanced since the early era of dictatorship. Investigating the story of a bomb that exploded in the offices of the daily newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* ten years prior, an oppositional journalist at *Repórter* named Luiz Alberto uncovered that although the government had originally blamed the bombing on leftist revolutionaries, it had in fact been planned by the armed forces under the auspices of AI-5. Neither Alberto nor his paper received any persecution for revealing the government violence and cover-up.⁴² According to Joan Dassin, the most important test of press freedoms during this period was the reporting of the 1981 Riocentro bomb plot, a plan by the ultra-right military to incite a counter-coup to reverse the *abertura*. In response to Riocentro “new techniques of investigative reporting were developed on the spot” and one Brazilian journalist even claimed that the press “passed with flying colors as the story was kept alive.”⁴³

Little was done when journalists revealed government bombings—along with other stories of secret torture and kidnappings—yet when Juvêncio Mazzarollo critiqued the Foz do Iguaçu military elite and become a leading disseminator of news on Itaipu, he was thrown in jail.⁴⁴ An assessment of Juvêncio’s trial reveals that contrary to the military’s official allegations, the charges brought against him had very little to do with his “Dead Cow” article.

Instead, they were the product of local and national interests that collided at one of the most delicate times of Brazil's transition away from military rule.

Freedom of Expression on Trial

Juvêncio Mazzarollo's trial started on November 11, 1981 and did not conclude until June 27 of the following year. The trial was a showcase of the military's stand against oppositional forces in the waning years of its regime, and drew interest from those who recognized the verdict's implications for the *abertura*. Journalists from two of Brazil's leading daily newspapers, *O Globo* and *O Estado de São Paulo*, were present throughout the trial and kept the country well informed of its proceedings.⁴⁵ This media presence shows that although Juvêncio was initially the lone voice covering the farmers' movement against Itaipu, by the time of his trial—and perhaps equally because of it—the story had now become a national topic.

Lead by the lawyer Rene Dotti, Juvêncio's defense cited *Nosso Tempo*'s coverage of the Itaipu conflict to argue that rather than advocating seditious politics, the newspaper was simply taking the side of a popular social movement. As reported by *Nosso Tempo*, out of all the questions raised during the trial, the question of Itaipu was “amplamente exposto. O movimento dos agricultores desapropriados por Itaipu, foi o mais profundamente analisado.”⁴⁶ This defense strategy reveals that public support for social movements like the farmers' struggle had become so acceptable at this stage of the *abertura* that Juvêncio's articles were fully justified. Far from being a radical, Juvêncio's defense sought to portray him as an average Brazilian during this era of transition.

The second defense strategy similarly placed Juvêncio's writings within a logic of other contemporary politics. To disprove the claim that *Nosso Tempo* was publishing subversive materials, Juvêncio's lawyer read aloud the platform of the Democratic Social Party (PDS, Partido Demócrata Social), the new iteration of the government's since-abolished ARENA party. The defense showed that Juvêncio's writings appeared quite in line with particular stances of the PDS, arguing that not only were his politics far from revolutionary, but that he even shared certain beliefs with right-wing political parties. A final tactic of Juvêncio's defense implicated Foz do Iguaçu's military elite, as Dotti said that the repression was “motivado por uma animosidade pessoal” from Colonel Labre.⁴⁷ Many outside of the courtroom also shared this opinion. In front of President Figueiredo and the Federal Assembly, a Paraná state deputy named Osvaldo Macedo gave a speech titled “Três exemplos de sabotagem à abertura de Figueiredo” in which he attacked Colonel Labre's abuse of power. Declaring that Colonel Labre only sought the “satisfação desse personalismo desvairado,” Macedo called on the President and deputies in attendance to

defend Juvêncio and to honor the meaning of democracy, concluding that, “A lei é a lei. Um coronel é apenas um coronel.”⁴⁸

The full magnitude of Juvêncio’s ongoing trial can only be understood by analyzing his actions and their implications from the perspective of Itaipu. As early as the late 1970s Juvêncio was already a known dissident, having written various pieces critical of Itaipu’s construction and its treatment of local communities.⁴⁹ As such, the launching of *Nosso Tempo* was considered a threat and Itaipu’s internal security warned the executive committee that “materiais subversivos” would soon circulate throughout the region.⁵⁰ Itaipu’s worries appear trenchant as over its first few months *Nosso Tempo* devoted the majority of its coverage to the farmers’ movement. This was a particularly delicate moment for Itaipu since it had to deal with the fallout of an article in *Time* magazine—published the exact same day as the start of the Foz do Iguaçu land encampment—that alleged massive corruption on the part of Itaipu’s director, General José Costa Cavalcanti.⁵¹ With their public image in doubt, Itaipu executives became increasingly anxious about Juvêncio Mazzarollo and his escalating calls for more radical action from the farmers and their supporters. In fact, confidential records show that a meeting was held on July 14 between Itaipu’s legal director, Paulo da Cunha, and the Ministry of Justice.⁵² During these talks it was decided that the SNI would gather information to build a case against the newspaper and that Cavalcanti should engage the Federal Courts toward the long-term goal of charging *Nosso Tempo*’s editors under the auspices of the LSN.

Two days after the secret meeting between Itaipu and the Ministry of Justice, Juvêncio published an article titled “Quando a violância se justifica” that surely forced the authorities into taking decisive action.⁵³ This conjecture is supported by a series of SNI memos sent directly to President Calvacanti over the following month that called for immediate legal action if the newspaper’s political tone did not change, and which emphasized that Itaipu was carefully monitoring a potential trial through its close connection to the Regional Superintendent of the Federal Police.⁵⁴ Perhaps more strikingly still is the fact that at Itaipu’s year-end legal conference, of the 41 agenda items concerning a wide array of topics from throughout 1981, the issue of Juvêncio Mazzarollo was the *only* one marked “confidencial” and “out of record”—leaving no details as to what exactly was discussed.⁵⁵ Finally, the minutes of a classified meeting organized jointly by the SNI and AESI reveal that on the whole, Itaipu was extremely pleased with the campaign of its Public Relations department, noting a clear decrease in “as críticas ao projeto Itaipu.” The sole exception, however, remained *Nosso Tempo* and its writers who continued to publish articles that were full of “insultos e provocações à autoridades e órgãos governamentais, [sobretudo] Itaipu Binacional.”⁵⁶ So while Itaipu and its collaborators in the dictatorship could celebrate a far more receptive

public, Juvêncio Mazzarollo remained an unfortunately persistent thorn in its side.

Through the chronology of Juvêncio's arraignment and the evidence revealed in the above-cited documents, it appears exceedingly likely that a combination of local forces, military officials, and Itaipu administrators wanted to silence *Nosso Tempo* and pressured the Supreme Military Tribunal to act accordingly. What had most likely started out as a vendetta by local elites soon merged with the national development interests of the dictatorship. Juvêncio Mazzarollo's trial thus stretched into 1982 with a great deal at stake for all those involved.

After nearly seven months of testimony, argument, and deliberation, a verdict was finally handed down at 2 p.m. on June 27, 1982. On charges relating to Articles 14, 36, and 42 of Brazil's National Security Act, Juvêncio Mazzarollo and *Nosso Tempo* were found by a unanimous vote to be not guilty. On the charge of Article 33 of the LSN, however, Juvêncio was found guilty—also by unanimous vote. Pertaining to offenses against government authorities, Article 33 carried possible prison time of up to four years. In Juvêncio's case, he was sentenced to only one year in jail to be followed by two years of conditional parole.⁵⁷ According to those present at the trial, the reading of the guilty verdict brought a stunned silence to the courtroom. A lieutenant colonel then asked the public to clear the room, which brought a few people in the gallery to tears. Juvêncio had to remain seated for an hour before three federal agents escorted him to a nearby police department and to the Piraquara prison later that night.⁵⁸ Juvêncio Mazzarollo, a man who colleagues would describe as “tímido, mas corajoso,” was being carted off to prison for criticizing a government that—in theory, at least—was already transitioning back to a free and open democracy.⁵⁹ A *Nosso Tempo* editorial emphasized the contradiction between the government's gestures at an honest reopening and the imprisonment of a journalist:

A mordomia, a corrupção, a roubalheria está sendo diariamente noticiada pela imprensa e por políticos dignos, sem que os responsáveis recebam punição. Juvêncio Mazzarollo, que ousou denunciar isto tudo, está atrás das grades.⁶⁰

The logic behind Juvêncio's imprisonment was complicated by national events that signaled a gradual reopening of political freedoms. A surge in labor militancy from 1978 to 1980 saw well over 4,000,000 workers go on strike, a catalyzing period for the opposition movement that Maria Helena Moreira Alves identifies as evidence of when “people began to lose their fear of the military government.”⁶¹ As social movements kept pressure on the military state from below, sectors of Brazil's opposition groups also mobilized around certain structural demands. Starting in the late 1970s the membership of

leftist political parties increased and had mounted enough pressure to force the government to hold a new round of elections. On November 15, 1982, all legally recognized parties—meaning that they had formed directorates in 20% of municipalities—were allowed to run candidates for city council, mayor, state assembly, governor, Congress, and the Senate.

This election was a pivotal step toward complete return to democratic rule, and almost 55 million Brazilians went to the polls to choose nearly 400,000 candidates.⁶² As important as the fact that so many Brazilian partook in the elections were the results themselves: the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) won the gubernatorial races in São Paulo and Minas Gerais and 21 legislative seats, and received 43% of the total vote, amounting to a huge victory for oppositional momentum and the left.⁶³ Additionally, Leonel Brizola, the returned exile who only a few years prior had been “anathema to the military” was elected governor of Rio de Janeiro.⁶⁴ The importance of the 1982 elections was unquestionable and, according to the James Green, the “results suggested that the days of the dictatorship were finally numbered.”⁶⁵ While oppositional parties celebrated electoral victories, and as workers throughout Brazil mobilized to reclaim their democratic rights, Juvêncio Mazzarollo remained locked in a jail cell.

A few months after Juvêncio was imprisoned, the lands surrounding Itaipu were finally flooded, and over fourteen days 29 billion cubic meters of water gushed into the dam’s reservoir area, forming a lake that covered 1,350 square kilometers of both Brazilian and Paraguayan lands.⁶⁶ In a span of two weeks a landscape that had been lush farmlands supporting thousands of families disappeared under water. Despite the victories of the Land and Justice Movement (most notably a 62% price increase), over 600 displaced families had yet to receive any compensation and a popular struggle persisted in the shadow of the Itaipu Dam. The plight of the displaced farmers, coupled with Juvêncio’s imprisonment, suggest that while many freedoms had been regained by the early 1980s, the fruits of the *abertura* were not shared by all Brazilians.

Despite having seen their colleague thrown in jail for criticizing the government, writers at *Nosso Tempo* actually increased their criticisms and dissident coverage in the aftermath of Juvêncio’s verdict. In 1983, for example, 30 of *Nosso Tempo*’s 42 issues (71%) had a front page that contained either a critique of military politics, or a headline relating to the evolving farmers’ struggle over land. This persistence did not go unnoticed by Itaipu and military officials, who received a SNI report acknowledging that *Nosso Tempo*’s “continua baseando-se nas seguintes características: opinativo, procura ser sensacionalista, adota linguagem característica da imprensa alternativa e publica matérias de caráter contestatória.”⁶⁷ So rather than toning down their stance against the dictatorship, *Nosso Tempo* devoted more energy to covering the same topics that had landed Juvêncio in prison.



Freedom for Juvêncio Mazzarollo. The caption is from Teotônio Vilela's visit to Juvêncio in prison. Source: files of the Mazzarollo family.

The outpouring of solidarity and support for Juvêncio paralleled the accelerating opposition movement. The Freedom for Juvêncio Mazzarollo Committee was formed within 24 hours of the announcement of the guilty verdict and the following morning the Paraná Student Union organized a demonstration in Paraná's state capital of Curitiba.⁶⁸ Marching through the

Boca Maldita neighborhood, the protest waved signs and distributed pamphlets denouncing the verdict as “uma violação da liberdade da imprensa e da expressão.” By that same afternoon, graffiti was spread across Curitiba and Foz de Iguaçu declaring, “Abaixo a Lei de Segurança Nacional!” and “Liberdade para Juvêncio!”⁶⁹

Juvêncio’s imprisonment became emblematic of the larger struggle to end the military’s reign in Brazil, and letters of solidarity poured in from all over Brazil that identified him as a symbol of Brazil’s democratic promise. After five months in prison, Juvêncio was visited by the prominent lawyer Dalmo Dallari, who said that “Mazzarollo, condenado pela LSN, é participante ativo do processo político brasileiro e sua coragem está sendo admirada em todo o Brasil, tendo seu nome se transformado numa bandeira para os que querem democratização no país.”⁷⁰ Other supporters explicitly contrasted Juvêncio’s repression to the supposed return of political freedoms. The National Labor Front (*Frente Nacional do Trabalho*) declared that, “A sua prisão é mais um fato que mostra o que vem a ser a chamada abertura, isto é, uma série de medidas superficiais para impressionar a nível internacional.”⁷¹ Juvêncio’s saga had in many ways become synonymous with national political struggles. A pamphlet put out by the Workers Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*, PT) calling for a general strike on October 25 included a set of demands in which freedom for Juvêncio was listed third—behind a denouncement of anti-wage laws and unemployment, yet before agrarian reform, union autonomy, free and direct elections, and breaking from the International Monetary Fund.⁷²

As the *abertura* continued along its curvy path, Juvêncio’s prospects of freedom were dealt a serious setback. Approaching the end of his initial one-year sentence, Juvêncio appealed for release on parole in September of 1983. In response to his request, the Supreme Military Tribunal voted 7-4 to instead *increase* his sentence by an additional two years.⁷³ This ruling had a tremendous impact on Juvêncio, both in terms of his political convictions and his own psychological wellbeing. As he revealed candidly to his close friend Aluizio Palmar, “só agora estou me dando conta na mão de quem estou . . . Só que não é possível qualquer otimismo em relação ao futuro. O que vejo sobre o Brasil é catastrófico. Estamos perdidos.”⁷⁴ This experience and feeling of hopelessness stayed with Juvêncio for the rest of his life. His widow, Vilma Macedo, believes that his time in prison left profound scars on his soul, and related that Juvêncio once confided to her that “ao acordar a tristeza já o esperava.”⁷⁵

The increase in his sentence forced Juvêncio to confront a reality that he had perhaps not yet been willing to consider. Rather than succumb to his newfound feelings of despair, he decided to take action. Emboldened by the contrast between his own repression and the growing freedoms being won outside his prison walls, Juvêncio protested the increase in his sentence by

staging a hunger strike. He went on strike October 23, 1983, writing that the Brazilian authorities,

Estão me roubando estupidamente a vida por razões fúteis. Nada, absolutamente nada justifica uma punição tão severa. Não posso mais permitir—por um dever ético para com a vida que Deus me deu—que inquisidores fascistas continuem fazendo de mim o pasto em que saciam seu sadismo e que desempenha, às minhas custas, o papel de opressores de toda a sociedade. . . . Já fui agredido demais. A situação é insuportável. Isto tem que acabar já.⁷⁶

The hunger strike attracted national media attention and placed enough pressure on state authorities that Paraná's senator, José Richa, publicly declared his intent to intercede at the federal level.⁷⁷ Along with informing the nation of his personal struggle, Juvêncio sought to use his hunger strike as a means to protest the LSN and the continued existence of a repressive Brazilian state. Human rights groups picked up the story of Juvêncio's hunger strike and Amnesty International mobilized a letter-writing campaign that sent thousands of letters from all over the world to Brazil's President, to the Minister of Justice, and to Minister of the Interior.⁷⁸ After sixteen days without food, he called an end to the hunger strike, writing that the action had served its purpose of bringing widespread attention to his cause. Moreover, he reemphasized the ideology driving his actions, writing that, "o direito à informação é de todos; nenhum homem é livre se não tem o direito de dizer e saber a verdade; nenhum país é livre quando tem uma lei que castiga quem denuncia o crime e não pune os verdadeiros criminosos."⁷⁹

By the spring of 1984, Juvêncio's situation remained unchanged and although the *abertura* seemed increasingly imminent at the national level, he was not yet free. His patience depleted and feeling his situation to be increasingly unsustainable, Juvêncio decided to once again take direct action. Exactly a year-and-a-half from when he was first put in prison, he began a second hunger strike. Claiming with "certeza absoluta" that he was the victim of a terrible injustice, the imprisoned writer vowed to only feed himself again as a freed man: "Liberdade ou morte—é a minha escolha . . . Tenho esperança de sobreviver, mas isso agora está nas mãos da Justiça, em quem, apesar de tudo, ainda sou levado a confiar."⁸⁰

His actions—along with the media attention generated by a second hunger strike—mobilized an unprecedented showing of support as solidarity actions spread across Brazil and beyond. The Board of Supervisors (*Câmara Municipal*) in Foz de Iguaçu voted unanimously to approve a motion of solidarity, declaring that, "Juvêncio nada mais fez do que denunciar a corrupção e se posicionar ao lados dos menos favorecidos." A commission was formed by members of the Paraná state Legislative Assembly to go to Brasília to lobby the national authorities to redress the "vergonha nacional" unfolding



Starting in February of 1984 (after 516 days) *Nosso Tempo* began printing a running tally of the length of Juvêncio's imprisonment in the top corner of the front page of almost every issue.

in Paraná. The National Committee of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) used their connections to rally support and attention. Brazil's most militant labor organization, the CUT, organized mass solidarity protests and circulated petitions demanding his release. Students throughout Brazil held rallies, and eight teenagers in Curitiba went as far as to stage their own hunger strike in solidarity. As far away as London, journalists and students in the British Communication School held assemblies and set up permanent encampments on their campus.⁸¹

The message delivered by Juvêncio's second hunger strike resonated with a population exhausted by twenty years of dictatorship. To the delight of the embattled journalist and his supporters, Juvêncio Mazarollo was freed from prison by order of the Supreme Court on April 6, 1984—ten days into his second hunger strike. In a decision with clear implications for the future direction of Brazil, in the end it was the Supreme Court—a federal body—that overturned the original sentencing handed down by the Military Tribunal. The complete return of civilian rule would not occur until the following March of 1985, but the symbolism of Juvêncio's release for Brazil's democratic opening cannot be understated. Sentenced in 1982 by a Military Tribunal, Juvêncio Mazarollo was freed two years later by a civilian court when a national solidarity movement turned his prison sentence into a flashpoint for Brazil's democratic opening. Juvêncio himself acknowledged that his suffering was shared by all Brazilians and he wrote that despite the solitude of his imprisonment, he was never alone “porque junto comigo era o povo... Minha liberdade foi uma conquista de todos. Foi uma vitória do povo e uma vitória de Justiça.”⁸² *Nosso Tempo's* lead headline proclaimed “Vencemos.”



Juvêncio Mazzarollo arriving at the Foz do Iguaçu airport after his release from prison.
Source: files of the Mazzarollo family.

Newspapers across Brazil carried the message of Juvêncio's release and hundreds of supporters gathered outside of his Curitiba prison to commemorate the conclusion of a long campaign that had, until that moment, provided very few moments worth celebrating.⁸³

Writing as a liberated journalist for the first time in nearly two years, Juvêncio Mazzarollo credited the popular struggle and solidarity movement for winning his freedom. He praised the efforts of collective actions, saying that

it was only through grassroots mobilization that “o último preso político do país pode sair de onde, por justiça, nunca devia ser entrado.”⁸⁴

Conclusion

It is difficult to outline an exact chronology for Brazil's *abertura*. While most scholars would trace the *abertura*'s earliest roots to 1974 and President Geisel's policy of *distensão* (political decompression), establishing its end point is far more complicated. Among the more persuasive arguments for when the *abertura* came to a close is with the 1979 reform laws, when amnesty was established for political exiles and the legal opposition was allowed to form new parties. Another compelling conclusion is the election of 1982 that was a sweeping success for opposition parties and was considered by many as a democratizing sea change.

The problem with this assertion, however, is that it assumes that events occurring in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasília reverberated at the same level and timescale across Brazil. The case of Juvêncio Mazzarollo is one example that forces a reinterpretation of how Brazil's transition was experienced throughout the country. While it is true that the *abertura* had been fundamentally advanced by 1982, Juvêncio's imprisonment showed that not all Brazilians belonged to this widening society. His two-year prison sentence under the National Security Act belies the assumption that the repression of journalists and political dissidents was almost non-existent by the early 1980s. For an understanding of local realities under dictatorship, it is clear that the Foz do Iguaçu elite considered themselves above the process of *abertura* and refused to loosen their grip on power. From a national perspective, the campaign to win Juvêncio's freedom suggested that for a portion of Brazilian society, democracy remained a distant notion.

Almost twelve months passed between Juvêncio's release and the day when the military government officially handed over power, but the journalist and his nation had traveled a common path. Many battles remained for those who fought for the end of military rule, but the freeing of Juvêncio was an example that Brazil's democratic opening was finally approaching. After 562 days in prison, Juvêncio was free. More significantly, after two decades of repression, Brazil itself had never been so close to winning its own liberation from the jaws of military rule. The end of dictatorship was made possible because various modes of opposition formed at all levels of society. Although scholars have yet to credit their role in Brazil's *abertura*, Juvêncio Mazzarollo and the farmers he wrote about were important figures in this process. As a journalist, Juvêncio Mazzarollo helped elevate the farmers' movement to wider prominence, and as a prisoner he became a symbol of life under Brazil's dictatorship.

This article does not aim to elevate the case of Juvêncio Mazzarollo to the same level as the 1979 reform bills, the 1982 elections, or the Diretas Já campaign. All of those events represented foundational shifts in the structure of Brazilian politics and the momentum of the popular forces behind them. Although on a smaller scale, Juvêncio's history does involve the similar processes of coalition building and mobilization that formed the core of Brazil's democratization. As scholars continue to construct a more thorough understanding of Brazil's military rule, it will be essential to complement the study of the dictatorship with a close examination of the *abertura* process that brought it to a close. The case of Juvêncio Mazzarollo—the last political prisoner of Brazil—provides fertile new ground for an understanding of the complexities of this era of transition.

Notes

1. An earlier version of this article won the 2013 Joaquim Nabuco Award from the University of Wisconsin–Madison's Brazil Initiative. Financial support for this research came from the Fulbright-Hays DDRA, the Social Science Research Council IDRF, the American Historical Association's Beveridge Grant, and the Tinker-Nave Foundation.

2. Descriptions of this encounter come from, *Nosso Tempo* 4/15/81, 6–7. All issues of *Nosso Tempo* cited in this article are housed at the Centro de Direitos Humanos e Memória Popular in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil.

3. Biographical information comes from Vilma Macedo, interview with author, 9/27/2014. Foz do Iguaçu.

4. John Howard White, "Itaipu: Gender, Community, and Work in the Alto Paraná Borderlands, Brazil and Paraguay, 1954–1989" (PhD Dissertation, University of New Mexico, 2010), 96.

5. Nilson Monteiro, *Itaipu, a luz* (Curitiba: Itaipu Binacional, Assessoria de Comunicação Social, 2000), 10.

6. In the spring of 1981 the farmers' movement officially adopted the name *o Movimento da Justiça e Terra*—the Justice and Land Movement.

7. Steve Stern, *Reckoning with Pinochet: The Memory Question in Democratic Chile, 1989–2006* (Durham: Duke UP, 2010), 356.

8. For the history of armed struggles, see João Quartim de Moraes, *Dictatorship and Armed Struggle in Brazil* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972). Three of the best works on the legal opposition movement in general are Maria Helena Moreira Alves, *State and opposition in military Brazil* (Austin: U of Texas P, 1985); Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85* (New York: Oxford UP, 1988); and Alfred C. Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1988). For the international dimension of the

opposition movement, see: James N. Green, *We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States* (Durham: Duke UP, 2010). For opposition and the church, see: Kenneth P. Serbin, *Secret Dialogues: Church-State Relations, Torture, and Social Justice in Authoritarian Brazil* (Pittsburgh, Pa: U of Pittsburgh P, 2000).

9. For media resistance, see: Bernardo Kucisnki, *Jornalistas e revolucionários: nos tempos da imprensa alternativa* (São Paulo: Editora Página Aberta, 1991); Maria Aparecida de Aquino, *Censura, imprensa, estado autoritário, 1968–1978: o exercício cotidiano da dominação e da resistência, O Estado de São Paulo e Movimento* (Bauru, SP: EDUSC, 1999); Fernando Molica and Antero Luiz, *10 reportagens que abalaram a ditadura* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record, 2005); Sandra Reimão, *Repressão e resistência: censura a livros na ditadura militar* (São Paulo, Brasil: EDUSP, 2011). For issues of censorship, see: Moacir Pereira, *O golpe do silêncio: imprensa, censura e medidas de emergência* (São Paulo: Global Editora, 1984); Anne-Marie Smith, *A Forced Agreement Press Acquiescence to Censorship in Brazil* (Pittsburgh, Pa: U of Pittsburgh P, 1997); Beatriz Kushnir, *Cães de guarda: jornalistas e censores, do AI-5 à constituição de 1988* (São Paulo: Boitempo Editorial, 2004); José Ernani de Almeida, *Denuncismo & censura nos meios de comunicação de Passo Fundo, 1964–1978* (Passo Fundo, RS: Méritos Editora Ltda, 2006).

10. Bernardo Kucisnki, *Jornalistas e revolucionários: nos tempos da imprensa alternativa* (São Paulo: Editora Página Aberta, 1991), xxvii.

11. Green, *We Cannot Remain Silent*, 321.

12. Bernardo Kucisnki, *O fim da ditadura militar: o colapso do “milagre econômico,” a volta aos quartéis, a luta pela democracia* (São Paulo: Contexto, 2001), 139.

13. This article is based primarily on research collected during two trips to Brazil between July 2013 and March 2015.

14. Prior to working as a co-editor at *Nosso Tempo*, Aluizio Palmar had been a member of the MR-8 revolutionary group. In the late 1960s Palmar was arrested, imprisoned, and tortured for his role with the MR-8, and in 1971 was freed as part of an exchange for the kidnapped Swiss ambassador, Giovanni Bucher. He spent most of his exile in Chile before returning to Brazil after the 1979 Amnesty Law.

15. It should be noted that most of *Nosso Tempo*'s ten-year run (1980–1990) has recently been digitized and can now be found at: <http://www.nossotempodigital.com.br/>

16. *Folha de São Paulo* used the term for the first time on page 6 of its December 24, 1983 issue.

17. The four *Coojournal* journalists freed in 1983 were Elmar Bones, Osmar Trindade, Rosvita Saueressig, and Rafael Guimarães. Kucisnki, *Jornalistas e revolucionários*, 219; Ricardo Lessa, e-mail correspondence with author, February 22, 2013.

18. *Nosso Tempo*, 3/12/80, 2.

19. *Nosso Tempo*, 3/12/80, 4.

20. *Nosso Tempo*, 12/17/80, 7–9.

21. *Nosso Tempo*, 12/24/80, 10–11.

22. *Nosso Tempo*, 12/24/80 11.

23. *Nosso Tempo*, 2/25/81, 13.

24. *Nosso Tempo*, 3/11/81, 12.
25. Germani, *Expropriados Terra e Agua*, 221.
26. *Nosso Tempo*, 3/18/1981, 7.
27. *Nosso Tempo*, 7/30/82, p 6.
28. Amnesty International, Document AMR 19/14/82. Source: files of the Mazzarollo family.
29. *Nosso Tempo*, 7/4/81, p 15.
30. The text of Article 14 of the LSN comes from *Nosso Tempo*, 10/7/82, 2.
31. *Nosso Tempo*, 4/15/81, 2.
32. *Nosso Tempo*, 4/15/81, 7.
33. *Nosso Tempo*, 4/15/81, 2.
34. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil*, 187.
35. Kucisnki, *Jornalistas e revolucionários*, xiii. Rivaldo Chinem, another journalist from this era, places the number of alternative press newspapers closer to 300. Chinem, *Jornalismo de guerrilha: a imprensa alternativa brasileira, da ditadura à internet* (São Paulo: Disal. 2004), 7.
36. Kucisnki, *Jornalistas e Revolucionários*, ix.
37. Kucisnki, *Jornalistas e Revolucionários*, xiii.
38. Discussing the period after his first meeting with the military forces, Juvêncio Mazzarollo wrote, "From that point on, they opened war on us." (*Nosso Tempo*, 9/30/81, 6)
39. *Nosso Tempo*, 9/30/81, 8.
40. The article in question was a general treatise about the malaise of Brazil's military government, and summarized Juvêncio's long-standing opinions on the need to return to a democratic society.
41. *Nosso Tempo*, 9/30/81, 6.
42. Chinem, *Jornalismo de Guerrilha*, 18. Alberto's article was titled "Descoberto plano que fabricou o AI-5 em 68."
43. Joan R. Dassin, "The Brazilian Press and the Politics of Abertura," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Aug., 1984), 396.
44. For more on other oppositional news stories during this period, see: Fernando Molica and Antero Luiz, *10 reportagens*.
45. *Nosso Tempo*, 7/30/82, 8.
46. Ibid.
47. *Nosso Tempo*, 10/7/82, 2.
48. A copy of this speech was sent by Deputy Macedo to Juvêncio, along with a personal note in which he hopes that "as ameaças que sofrem o jornal se limitem apenas à arrogância do coronel e aos ressentimentos do Juiz." Source: files of the Mazzarollo family.
49. News articles include an April 12, 1979 piece in *Hoje* titled "Itaipu: o preço desumano do progresso." Most importantly, in 1980 he published a book on the Santa Helena land encampment and the early iteration of the farmers' movement: Juvêncio Mazzarollo, *A taipa da injustiça: Itaipu x agricultores expropriados*, (Curitiba, Brazil: Comissão Pastoral da Terra, 1980).

50. Confidential Memo. Itaipu Binacional, Informação No. E/AESI.G/IB/BR/0061/80. Document dated 11/19/1980. Source: Itaipu Binacional Centro de Documentação, Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil (hereafter IBCD).

51. Christopher Byrons, Jonathan Beaty, & Gisela Bolte, “Big Profits in Big Bribery,” *Time*, 3/16/1981, 60–65. In discussing bribery scandals around the globe, the authors allege that Itaipu received as much as \$140 million in payoffs and kickbacks from European electric companies. Itaipu’s concerns over the *Time* article and the looming spectre of *Nosso Tempo* are summarized in a confidential AESI report from September 14, 1981. (Itaipu Binacional, microfilm No. R3530.1024-1035. Source: IBCD) It should also be noted that Itaipu was equally concerned with *Nosso Tempo*’s persistent coverage of the poor working conditions and low wages of its construction workers. (Itaipu Binacional. Microfilm No. 9192F 0001. 2/12/1981. Source: IBCD)

52. Informação No. 224/81/03/DSI/MJ; contained in folder SNI ACE.18410/81, Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro. These documents—along with millions more from Brazil’s military regime—have only recently been made available through the “Memórias reveladas” project of the Ministry of Justice.

53. *Nosso Tempo*, 5/6/1981, 2.

54. Informação No. 0290/19/AC/81; contained in folder SNI ACE.18410/81, Arquivo Nacional, Rio de Janeiro; AESI.G/IB/BR/010/81. Document dated July 1981. Courtesy of Aluizio Palmar.

55. Itaipu Binacional. I/AJ.ADV/0153/81. Microfilm No. R3530.1075-1083. 10/6/1981. Source: IBCD

56. E/AESI.G/IB/BR/056/81. 11/30/1981. Courtesy of Aluizio Palmar.

57. “Mazzarollo condenado na LSN.” *O Estado do Paraná*, 6/23/1982. Source: files of the Mazzarollo family.

58. *Nosso Tempo*, 10/7/82, 2.

59. Werner Fuchs, interview with author, 7/13/2013. Curitiba, Brazil.

60. Ibid.

61. Maria Helena Moreira Alves, “Interclass Alliances in the Opposition to the Military in Brazil: Consequences for the Transition Period,” in *Power and Protest: Latin American Social Movements*. Ed. Susan Eckstein, 295. (Berkeley: U of California P, 1989). The labor actions of 1978–1980 included 187 different strikes with the participation of 4,441,731 workers. Alves, *State and Opposition*, 197–208.

62. Alves notes that the 1982 elections were held throughout Brazil, “except in state capitals and municipalities considered of interest to national security, which remained within the indirect election system.” Alves, *State and Opposition*, 221.

63. *Nosso Tempo*, 1/15/83, 12. Another victory for the opposition occurred when the hard-right wing of the military was discredited when their attempt to steal votes was uncovered by the media. Through an information consulting firm called Proconsult, a faction of the military attempted to hijack the vote counting software to steal the election, but was unsuccessful. Kucinski, *O Fim da Ditadura Militar*, 136.

64. Thomas Skidmore, “Brazil’s Slow Road to Democratization: 1974–1985,” in *Democratizing Brazil*, 29.

65. Green, *We Cannot Remain Silent*, 349.
66. Of the total area flooded for the Itaipu reservoir, 780 km² were Brazilian and 570 km² were Paraguayan. (Ribeiro, *Memórias do Concreto*, 27.)
67. Confidential SNI report. SNI 003214/81, 8/12/1982. Courtesy of Aluizio Palmar.
68. The Freedom for Juvêncio Mazzarollo Committee would become the central hub of solidarity action and support. According to the files of the Federal Police, the group would eventually be organized and led by the youth section of the PMDB, primarily it's president, Carlos Grellmann, who would later be elected as a state deputy. Source: Confidential Federal Police report 0300/83-SI/DPF:1/FI/PR. 10/21/1983. Courtesy of Aluizio Palmar.
69. *Nosso Tempo*, 10/29/82, 15.
70. *Nosso Tempo*, 3/10/83, 2.
71. Statement from Frente Nacional do Trabalho. 10/22/1982. Source: files of the Mazzarollo family.
72. Document from the Partido dos Trabalhadores, October 1983. Source: files of the Mazzarollo family.
73. *Nosso Tempo*, 3/10/83, 2.
74. Letter from Juvêncio Mazzarollo to Aluizio Palmar, 12/21/1982. Source: files of the Mazzarollo family.
75. Vilma Macedo, interview with author, 9/27/2014. Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil.
76. *Nosso Tempo*, 11/4/83, 23.
77. *Nosso Tempo*, 11/11/83, 1.
78. The personal files of Juvêncio Mazzarollo contain copies of over 1,500 letters that were sent to the Brazilian authorities as part of the Amnesty International campaign, representing fifteen countries: Greece, Tasmania, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Belgium, the USA, Canada, France, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia. Source: files of the Mazzarollo family.
79. *Nosso Tempo*, 11/11/83, 2.
80. Letter from prison written by Juvêncio Mazzarollo, 3/28/1984. Source: files of the Mazzarollo family.
81. Details on solidarity actions come from *Nosso Tempo*, 4/6/84, 20 and *Nosso Tempo*, 4/13/84, 15.
82. *Nosso Tempo*, 4/13/84, 15.
83. "Supremos liberto o último preso político do País," *O Estado de São Paulo*, 4/7/1984. Source: files of the Mazzarollo family.
84. *Nosso Tempo*, 4/13/84, 15.